O Direito Especial à Gerência: Garantias de Tutela Versus Interesse Social
1 ISCET – High Institute of Business and Tourism Sciences, Porto, Portugal
To cite this text:
Amorim, A. C. A. (2012), O Direito Especial à Gerência: Garantias de Tutela Versus Interesse Social, Percursos & Ideias, Vol. 3&4, pp. 3-14.
In limited companies based on a personal structure, partners are frequently entitled to special access to management, which consists in derogating the principle on free dismissal of directors, so that the cessation of the administration position depends on just cause verification and a judicial proceeding. As being the legal issue able to resolve the conflict of interests emerging from the violation of the director’s duties or his inability to exercise his functions, the removal from office is founded upon a non-demandingness criterion that defines, in each case, the necessary measure for social interest protection, disregarding personal interest. This paper aims to describe the prerogatives conferred to partners by the special access to management and then, using an objective approach, confront these prerogatives with the predominance of social interest, which is the ulterior intention of the legal regime.
Limited companies, Special rights, Management, Dismissal, Social interest.